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SYMPOSIUM
IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT: WHY
THE GRAND JURY'S ACCUSATORY
FUNCTION SHOULD NOT BE
CHANGED
THOMAS P. SULLIVAN*
ROBERT D. NACHMAN**
The federal grand jury system has emerged relatively unscathed
from the stormy attacks of the 1970's, when critics, decrying the
political abuse of the grand jury by the Nixon administration, called
for radical changes to the system. The 95th Congress considered
several different reform bills, 1 including no less than four alternative
constitutional amendments to abolish all or part of the fifth amendment requirement that grand jury indictments initiate federal prosecutions. In addition, the American Bar Association (hereinafter
"A.B.A.") approved an authoritative position paper advocating sig2
nificant changes (hereinafter "A.B.A. Principles").
This reforming fervor has produced few tangible results. In
1979, Congress amended Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to require the recording of all grand jury proceedings,
except the jurors' deliberations and voting.3 Congress amended the
rule further in 1983 to clarify certain matters concerning the secrecy
* Partner, Jenner & Block, Chicago; United States Attorney, Northern District of
Illinois, 1977-1981; LL.B. Loyola University, 1952.
** Associate, Jenner & Block, Chicago; J.D. Harvard University, 1983; A.M. University of Chicago, 1973; B.A. University of Michigan, 1972.
1 See GrandJuryReform: Hearingson H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 484 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; The GrandJury Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on
S. 3405 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practiceand Procedure of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1978).
2 For a list of these principles, see ABA GRAND JURY PoLicY AND MODEL AcT 4-5 (2d
ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA Pamphlet].
3 Order Amending FED. R. CRim. P. 6, 441 U.S. 985 (1979).
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of grand jury proceedings.4 In 1980, the Department of Justice issued new, comprehensive guidelines governing the work of United
States attorneys (hereinafter "Department of Justice guidelines").5
These new legislative and executive responses to widespread criticism of the grand jury have fallen short of the wishes and expectations of many reformers; nonetheless, for the time being, at least,
the federal grand jury as an institution appears to be relatively
stable.
The federal grand jury is a powerful body.6 It may summon
practically anyone it wants, and, through the statute providing for
the immunization of witnesses, 7 it may compel a summoned person
to testify or risk going to jail for contempt. It conducts its business
through secret proceedings which are largely unreviewable by the
courts.8 It may indict any person or entity, and thus require that
defendant to stand trial for the alleged crime.9
Order Amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 6, 461 U.S. 1117 (1983).
5 U.S. Department of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution, 27 GRIM. L. REP.
3277 (1980).
6 The grand jury arose out of King Henry II's Assize of Clarendon in the year 1166.
It began essentially as an administrative agency of the King. The King used it to gain
power over the church and feudal barons. The Assize of Clarendon provided that all
felony prosecutions were to be initiated by presentment to the grand jury, a group of
twelve subjects of the king. Thus, the original grand jury had solely an accusatory,
rather than protective function.
The grand jury did not emerge as a protector of citizens against the oppression of
government until 1681. At that time, King Charles II sought to charge members of the
Protestant opposition with treason. The grand jurors, resisting the King's attempts to
have their proceedings held in public, held private sessions in which they voted not to
indict the King's targets. This concept of the grand jury as protector of citizens was
carried over from England to the American colonies. In 1743, whenJohn Peter Zenger,
a New York newspaper publisher aroused British anger by criticizing the Colony's governor, prosecutors sought two grand juries to return indictments for criminal libel
against him, but both resisted the governor's pressure and declined to indict Zenger.
Subsequent to the Revolution, the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution formally incorporated the requirement that a grand jury initiate felony prosecutions. Many states incorporated similar provisions into their own constitutions.
However, in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Supreme Court refused to
incorporate the fifth amendment's grand jury requirement into the fourteenth amendment's concept of due process of law. Thus, the states remain free to proceed with
felony prosecutions by means other than grand jury indictments. For the history of the
grand jury, see generally M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON
TRIAL 6-17 (1977); Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 342 n.3 (1974) and sources
cited therein.
Since Hurtado, several states have done away with grand juries entirely, and many
others, while retaining some form of grand jury, provide for alternative means of initiat4

ing criminal prosecution. For a survey of state practices, see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 264-270 (1977).

7 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1976).
8 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d), (e).
9 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V; FED. R. GRIM. P. 6.
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Knowledgeable observers recognize and concede that federal
grand juries do not protect citizens from unwarranted accusations
by the government. 10 Rather, federal grand juries usually adopt the
prosecutor's suggestions, and readily return indictments against the
persons and upon the charges the prosecutor recommends. 1
The tremendous power of federal grand juries, and the occasional abuse of authority by prosecutors who control that power, has
led to calls for the abolition of the grand jury, 12 or for substantial
reform of its proceedings, 13 in order to make the grand jury more
independent of the prosecutor. This Article examines the accusatory function of the federal grand jury system in light of these proposals. It explores whether the system is working as intended, and
to the extent it is not, which proposals hold the best chances for
effecting meaningful change without crippling the law enforcement
process.
This Article concludes that the grand jury should, with a few
minor changes, remain as the body to initiate federal prosecutions,
because the grand jury, by and large, adequately fulfills an appropriate accusatory function. Although overzealous or overreaching federal prosecutors can manipulate the federal grand jury, by and large
the Department of Justice has not abused its authority. Furthermore, no current proposal for reform of the federal grand jury system can eliminate the possibility of abuse without unduly
obstructing federal law enforcement and federal courts, and adding
substantial cost and delay to the federal criminal justice system.
Thus, the protection of citizens is best left in the hands of the conscientious prosecutors who occupy the offices of United States Attorney and their assistants throughout the country. The last part
10 See, e.g., Arenella, Reforming the Federal GrandJury and the State Preliminary Hearingto
Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 Micn. L. REV. 463 (1980).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973). "It is, indeed, common knowledge that the grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between the citizen and
the Government, is now a tool of the Executive." Id. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
It has been alleged - and probably proven - that during the Nixon administration,
the Department ofJustice's Internal Security Division used federal grand juries against
perceived enemies of the national administration. Government-sponsored undercover
activities and threats of grand jury subpoenas created discord and suspicion among the
dissident groups against which they were directed, and often led to these groups losing
their effectiveness. House Hearings,supra note 1, at 13-16 (testimony of Linda Bakiel).
The Internal Security Division persuaded federal grand juries to indict roughly 400 dissidents, less than 15% of whom were ultimately convicted of any crime. See Arenella,
supra note 10 at 506 n.221.
12 See, e.g., Campbell, Eliminate the GrandJury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174
(1973).
13 See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 10.
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THE DOMINANCE OF THE PROSECUTOR OVER THE GRAND JURY,
AND Two CRITICAL RESPONSES

Critics of the grand jury begin with the observation that grand
juries no longer perform an independent screening function, but instead merely "rubber stamp" indictments tendered by prosecutors. 14 We believe this is true in most instances. Federal
prosecutors and their assistants, in cooperation with the federal investigative agencies, decide upon the persons and subject matters to
investigate, the witnesses to call, and the documents to subpoena.
They decide which targets to pursue and which witnesses to immunize. They often orchestrate the investigations of other independent federal agencies. They act as counsel to the grand jury, advising
it on legal issues, and in effect, represent the grand jury in hearings
on grand jury matters before the federal judiciary. Given this role of
federal prosecutors, it is understandable that the members of the
grand jury come to rely upon the prosecutors to summon and produce appropriate witnesses and documents, and come to trust the
prosecutors' judgment as to which cases they should pursue, and
whom they should indict.
When a federal prosecutor seeks an indictment from the grand
jury, almost invariably the grand jury returns a true bill. 15 Indeed,
"no bills" are so rare that prosecutors regard them as freak
occurrences.16
Experienced federal defense lawyers understand the prosecutor's near total control of the grand jury. When they seek to avoid
indictment of their clients, these defense attorneys rarely ask to have
their clients appear before the grand jury. Rather, the defense lawyers address their arguments and pleas to the prosecutor, and sometimes have their clients submit to interviews with the prosecutor and
the investigating agents, because they assume that the prosecutor,
not the grand jury, will determine who will be indicted, and for
14 See, e.g., Arenella, Reforming the State GrandJury System: A Model GrandJury Act, 13
RUTGERs L.J. 1, 9 (1981); Campbell, supra note 12.

15 When federal prosecutors decide that a case, including cases in which the grand
jury has reviewed evidence, should not result in an indictment, they do not present the
case to the grand jury for return of a no bill. Rather, they fill out a form called a "Declination" in which they set forth the reasons why the case has been terminated without
presentation to the grand jury for indictment.
16 During the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, grand juries returned 17,419
indictments and only 68 "no true bills." Statistical Report of U.S. Attorneys' Offices,
Fiscal Year 1984 (Report 1-21), introductory material, p.2.
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what. These experienced practitioners treat the grand jury's vote
17
simply as a formality.
Critics have responded in two ways to the erosion of the grand
jury's traditional role as an independent buffer between the state
and the citizenry. Some critics have called for a total abolition of the
grand jury system. They suggest that the grand jury be replaced by
a system in which the prosecutor commences prosecution by means
of an information, and the target of prosecution has a right to a full
preliminary hearing before a neutral magistrate.' 8 States which
have abolished the grand jury system use systems similar to that
proposed. 19 Other critics, notably the A.B.A., advocate retaining
the grand jury but reforming certain aspects of grand jury practice
in order to curb prosecutorial power and return the grand jury to its
role as a screening device, designed to separate worthy from un20
worthy prosecutions.
Either abolition or extensive reform of the grand jury's accusatory function would add extra steps to the process of criminal prosecution, and foreseeably, would change other aspects of the criminal
justice system as well. 2 1 Because of the magnitude of the changes
which either abolition or reform would bring, it behooves a legislator or member of the public interested in the criminal justice system
to analyze carefully both the premises upon which the abolition or
reform proposals are based, and the impact that the enactment of
each proposal would have, before deciding whether to support a
change of the system.
II.

THE GRAND JURY SHOULD BE RETAINED

In a 1973 article, Judge William J. Campbell, a former United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and later Chief
Judge of the District Court, proposed the abolition of the grand
jury. 22 Under Judge Campbell's plan, the prosecutor would have
the subpoena power and the authorization to interrogate witnesses
in secret. An information filed by the prosecutor would commence
prosecution, followed by a probable cause hearing before a judicial
officer, such as a magistrate, who would determine whether there
17 That is not to say that the grand jury is not at times helpful to the prosecutor. See
infra text accompanying notes 18-21.
18 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 12.
19 California, among other states, utilizes preliminary hearings in many instances.
For a state by state survey of grand jury responsibilities, seeJ. VAN DYKE, supra note 6 at
Appendix B.
20 See Arenella, supra note 14.
21 See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
22 Campbell, supra note 12.
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was sufficient evidence to permit the prosecution to continue.23
Judge Campbell said that this change, which would require amending the Constitution, would curb the abuses of overzealous prosecutors who now "hide anonymously behind the shield of the grand
jury." 24 Although Judge Campbell did not specify the abuses involved, it seems he feared that federal prosecutor-dominated grand
juries indict people on insufficient evidence. By entrusting the determination as to whether a case ought to be permitted to go to trial
to a neutral magistrate, rather than the grand jury, "[t]rue independence would be restored, thereby revitalizing the concept that a citizen should be protected against unfounded accusation of crime,
' 25
whatever its source."
We maintain that the proponent of a major change, such as that
proposed by Judge Campbell, has a heavy burden of proof to support a need for a change. Regarding the federal system, we respectfully disagree with the premise underlying Judge Campbell's
argument. We have seen no evidence which demonstrates or even
suggests that the current federal system fosters unjust accusations.
26
Indeed, the available evidence is precisely to the contrary.
Even if unjust accusations were rampant in federal courts,
Judge Campbell's proposed solution - replacement of the grand
jury with a system of prosecutorial information followed by a preliminary hearing - will do little or nothing to protect a citizen
against an unfounded accusation. If Congress enacts this new system, prosecutors will be able to file informations against anyone
they choose, even people they might not be able to persuade a
grand jury to indict under the present system. Prosecutors could
announce these informations to the press with fanfare equal to that
surrounding the most sensational indictments. Once the news is
public, the accused will face the stigma which accompanies any official public accusation. 2 7 Since the preliminary hearing will probably
occur sooner than a trial does under the current system, a defendant
23 Id. at 174,
24 Id. at 181.
25 Id. at 180.

180.

26 See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
27 The authors whole-heartedly agree with Judge Frank's observation in In re Fried,
161 F.2d 453, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1947) (Frank, J., concurring):
[A] wrongful indictment is no laughing matter; often it works a grievous, irreparable
injury to the person indicted. The stigma cannot be easily erased. In the public
mind, the blot on a man's escutcheon, resulting from such a public accusation of
wrong doing, is seldom wiped out by a subsequent judgment of not guilty. Frequently, the public remembers the accusation, and still suspects guilt, even after an
acquittal.
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may receive relief from an unjust accusation more quickly in Judge
Campbell's proposed system. This probable benefit, however, does
not justify the detriments of the proposed change.
Moreover, Judge Campbell's willingness to abolish the grand
jury overlooks the positive functions a federal grand jury serves.
Often, experienced grand jury members ask incisive questions of
witnesses, make helpful suggestions as to which witnesses or documents the prosecutor should subpoena, and which leads the prosecutor should pursue. In addition, the grand jury gives the
prosecutor a feel for how the case will appear to a petit jury.28 The
grand jury's reaction may lead the prosecutor to re-evaluate the evidence supporting a particular case. As a result, the prosecutor may
either strengthen the proof or drop the contemplated indictment.
Most importantly, the federal grand jury helps to prevent
prosecutorial excesses during the witness interrogation process.
The presence of citizens discourages the occasional overzealous or
misguided prosecutor from abusing witnesses, questioning them
unfairly, or otherwise violating their rights. We fear that if prosecutors are given compulsory process to summon witnesses to their offices for questioning, without any citizens present to observe,
prosecutors will tend to pressure, cajole, threaten, and through
other means attempt to have witnesses state either what the prosecutors believe is the truth, or what they need in order to make their
cases. We do not mean to say that federal prosecutors are evil or
deliberately tinker with the truth-seeking process; we firmly believe
that the vast majority are not evil and do not tinker. But we know
the inclinations that virtually all advocates have - to conceive a theory of the case, and then view all testimony and evidence in a light
most favorable to that theory. Inexperienced federal prosecutors
can easily adopt a zealous, righteous frame of mind. Their oath of
office confers on them no immunity from the frailties which beleaguer the rest of us. The grand jury's very presence stems the prosecutors' inclination to overstep; it changes a potential "hot-box"
interrogation into a formal inquiry before outside observers who
have no direct stake in the outcome of the investigation.
Finally, we believe Judge Campbell's suggested reform would
increase drastically the cost and time of federal criminal prosecution. In complicated white collar crimes or in multi-faceted conspiracies, a probable cause hearing may last for weeks.2 9 Even when
28 A petit jury is the ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 445 (abridged 5th ed. 1983).

29 For example, the preliminary hearings in People v. McMartin (a celebrated Califor-
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probable cause is not seriously disputed, defense attorneys would
cross-examine government witnesses in order to discover the government's evidence. Most likely, this additional layer of pre-trial
hearings would require a new cadre of federal judges or magistrates
as well as many more federal prosecutors.
III.

THE GRAND JuRY'S ACCUSATORY FUNCTION NEEDS

No

MAJOR REFORMS

The perception of extensive grand jury abuse which animated
Judge Campbell's call for abolition of the grand jury has led other
critics to propose widespread reform of the grand jury. We believe
that the best reasoned and most comprehensive proposals for reform are embodied in the A.B.A.'s Grand Jury Reform Principles
and its proposed Model Grand Jury Act (hereinafter "Model
Act"). 30 The rationale behind these proposals is set forth in detail
in two articles by Professor Peter Arenella, the A.B.A.'s Reporter for
the Model Act. 31 The Principles, the Model Act, and the two
Arenella articles embody a coherent philosophy of reform, which we
will examine in light of our experiences. We will focus exclusively
on the proposals affecting the grand jury's accusatory, rather than
investigative function.
The A.B.A. proposals to reform the grand jury's accusatory
function assume that grand juries indict individuals who should not
be indicted. The proposals lay the blame for this at the feet of overzealous, sometimes unscrupulous prosecutors, who are unchecked
by an independent grand jury. 32 The reformers argue that the
grand jury insulates the prosecutor from public scrutiny and thereby
inadvertently abets prosecutorial abuse.3 3 In order to stop unwarranted indictments, the A.B.A. seeks to transform the grand jury
from a prosecutorial "puppet" to an independent screening body.
nia child molestation case) lasted several months. See L.A. DailyJ., Feb. 15, 1985, at 1,
col. 6; L.A. Daily J., Jan. 31, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
30 For a listing of these principles, see ABA Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 4-5. A.B.A. Principles will be cited by number as they appear in this footnote. For the Model GrandJury
Act, see Arenella, supra, note 14, at 15-49. Cites to the Model Grand Jury Act are by
section number as it appears on those pages. Although the A.B.A. has not approved the
entire Model Grand Jury Act, we will refer to the act as it was approved by the Grand
Jury Committee, since the total act is the logical extension of the A.B.A.'s philosophy of
reform. (Those portions of the Act approved by the A.B.A. are printed in the ABA Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 16-19.) Also, even though the Act refers solely to reform of the
state grand jury system, we discuss it in a federal context because its principles, if accepted, call for similar reform of the federal system.
31 See Arenella, supra note 10; Arenella, supra note 14.
32 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
33 See Arenella, supra note 10; Campbell, supra note 12.
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This transformation involves two steps. First, a judge should be required to tell grand jurors that they must carefully screen cases, and
second, prosecutors should be required to support their requests
for indictment with evidence of the type that they will be required to
produce at trial.3 4 The A.B.A. proposals include, among others: (1)
requiring that the judge inform the grand jury of its duty to screen
out unworthy prosecutions; 35 (2) giving the target of a grand jury
investigation the right to testify before the grand jury;3 6 (3) requir37
ing the prosecutor to present all available exculpatory evidence;
(4) forbidding the use of evidence which would be constitutionally
inadmissible at trial to support an indictment;3 8 and (5) prohibiting
the use of hearsay testimony to support an indictment, except under
narrowly defined circumstances.3 9 To put teeth into these new
rules, the Model Act provides for a post-indictment, pre-trial hearing to test the validity of the indictment.4 0 At the hearing, a judge
A.B.A. Principles 6 and 29; Model Grand Jury Act §100.
A.B.A. Principles 22 and 27; Model Grand Jury Act § 204.
A.B.A. Principle 5; Model Grand Jury Act § 102.
37 A.B.A. Principle 3; Model Grand Jury Act § 101.
38 A.B.A. Principle 6; Model Grand Jury Act § 100.
39 A.B.A. Principle 31, relating to hearsay, was enacted by voice vote in the February
1984 Mid-Year Meeting (reported in 52 U.S.L.W. 2473 (1984)). See A.B.A. 1984 Midyear Meeting, Reports with Recommendations to the House of Delegates 108B [hereinafter cited as 1984 Mid-Year Meeting Report]; Model Grand Jury Act § 100.
40 This provision, intended to give effect to A.B.A. Principle 25, is found in Model
Grand Jury Act § 105. It reads as follows:
Section 105: MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT ON GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF GRAND JURY EVIDENCE
1. After arraignment upon an indictment, the court may, upon motion of the
defendant made within [30] days after receipt of the grand jury transcript or as the
court otherwise provides, dismiss such indictment or any count thereof upon the
ground that the evidence before the grand jury was not legally sufficient to establish
the offense charged or any lesser included offense.
2. The evidence presented to the grand jury is legally sufficient if, viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, it would constitute probable cause as to each element of the crime. The court's review of the evidence shall be a review of the grand
jury transcripts (either written or electronically recorded) and exhibits, without further testimony.
3. In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand
jury, the court can only consider evidence which would be admissible at trial except
for hearsay testimony admitted under § 100(2)-(4). The fact that the grand jury considered evidence which would have been excluded at trial does not invalidate the
indictment as long as the remaining competent evidence is legally sufficient to constitute probable cause as to each element of the crime; except in those cases where
the nature, extent, and prejudicial effect of the incompetent evidence presented to
the grand jury provides strong grounds for believing that the grand jury would not
have indicted the defendant if it had only considered the legally admissible evidence
presented to it.
4. The validity of an order denying any motion made pursuant to this section is
not reviewable upon an appeal from ajudgment of conviction following trial based
upon legally sufficient evidence.
34

35
36

1056

SULLIVAN AND NACHMAN

[Vol. 75

or magistrate will review the transcript of grand jury proceedings to
ensure that the proceedings complied with Model Act procedures,
and to weigh independently the evidence presented to the grand
4
jury for legal sufficiency. '
Most of the proposed rules for grand jury procedure strike us as
sensible, and most are consistent with Department of Justice policy. 4 2 But we believe that it is a mistake to grant each defendant a
right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a grand
jury indictment. In complex cases involving lengthy testimony and
numerous documents, "sufficiency" hearings would place substantial burdens on the judiciary. We believe that this additional burden
on the federal system is not warranted, for there is no hard evidence
that prosecutors, federal or state, engage in the kinds of misconduct
which these proposals are designed to prevent. 4 3 Rather than making the encounter between the government and the target a fairer
one, these proposals will add substantial time and expense to what
is already a slow, cumbersome, and costly process.
Before taking drastic steps which embrace such troubling consequences, a legislative body must satisfy itself that a serious problem with the current system exists. The A.B.A. proposals to reform
the accusatory function of the federal grand jury begin with the link
between prosecutorial power and abuse of the system: "The most
obvious defect [of the grand jury system] is the grand jury's complete dependence on the prosecutor for all its information, advice,
and direction. '4 4 This observation precedes a catalogue of the
enormous powers of the prosecutor in a grand jury proceeaing,
compared to the powerlessness of the citizens whom the grand jury
chooses to investigate: the grand jury can subpoena someone
within its jurisdiction virtually at will; it can conduct fishing expeditions without first establishing any likelihood of wrongdoing; it can
strip individuals of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination by granting them immunity; and it may jail them for failure to
comply after being granted immunity. 45 In short, reformers argue
that the omnipotent government can, and often does, take advantage of the hapless, defenseless citizen, who does not even have the
46
benefit of counsel within the grand jury room.
As we have observed above, we believe that many of the reform41 Id.
42 See infra notes 88-91, 101-104, 106, & 107 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
44 Arenella, supra note 14, at 9.

45 Id.
46 Id. at 9-10.
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ers' perceptions about the prosecutor's domination over the grand
jury are accurate. 4 7 However, merely detailing the prosecutor's
power over the grand jury and painting the citizen-grand jury confrontation in David and Goliath terms does not make a case for the
need to reform grand jury accusatory proceedings. Instead, a meaningful call to reform the grand jury's accusatory function must begin
with sound proof that, under the current system, the grand jury indicts people who should not be indicted. If this is not the case, it
will be counter-productive to add more steps to the accusatory process. In other words, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."
To determine whether grand juries indict inappropriate people,
one must first define whom the grand jury properly should indict.
Justice Department Principles, the A.B.A. proposals, and common
sense all suggest that the likelihood of conviction at trial should be
the chief standard of indictability. 4 8 The standard should also give
weight to the nature and seriousness of the offense, the wishes of
the victim, and the background of the target.
A grand jury indictment represents the decision of a grand jury
to cause the government to try someone for the alleged commission
of a crime. An indictment should not be used as a form of punishment. A prosecutor who is convinced that a person has committed
an offense, but believes that the government probably will be unable
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, should not seek an
indictment. The Department ofJustice guidelines are also in agreement: "The attorney for the government should commence or recommend federal prosecution if he believes that the person's
conduct constitutes a federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction. .

. ."49

A comment to this principle clarifies the standard: "as

a matter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient
administration ofjustice, no prosecution should be initiated against
any person unless the government believes that the person probably
will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact." 50 The Model
47 See text accompanying supra note 30.
48 A.B.A. Principle 4; U.S. Department ofJustice, Principles of Federal Prosecution,
Part B.2, 27 CR. L. REP. at 3277, 3278-79 (1980) [hereinafter Principles of Federal Prosecution, Part B.2].
49 Principles of Federal Prosecution, Part B.2.
50 Id. at 3279. The comment makes clear that the standard to be used is that of an
unbiased trier of fact. Where bias makes conviction unlikely, the prosecutor may still
proceed.
The potential that - despite the law and the facts that create a sound, prosecutable
case - the fact-finder is likely to acquit the defendant because of the unpopularity
of some factor involved in the prosecution or because of the overwhelming popularity of the defendant or his or her cause, is not a factor prohibiting prosecution.
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Grand Jury Act suggests a similar "probability of conviction"
51
standard.
A prosecutor working with a grand jury has a strong incentive
to seek indictments only in those cases in which there is a substantial
probability of securing a conviction at trial. Prosecutors pride themselves on winning a high percentage of their cases. 52 And since the
prosecutor who secures an indictment will be identified with the
case, that prosecutor is unlikely to press for an indictment when the
evidence appears insufficient to convict. 5 3 Even when a prosecutor
will not personally handle the case beyond the indictment stage, he
is loathe to "saddle one of his cohorts with the trial of a 'turkey.' "54
Department ofJustice statistics indicate that federal prosecutors
indict only when there is a strong likelihood of conviction. Over the
last decade, federal prosecutors convicted the great majority of all
defendants who were prosecuted - 65.2% by plea of guilty or, in a
few instances, nolo contendere, and 12.5% by conviction at trial. 55
56
Only 3.5% of all defendants were acquitted at trial.
The remaining defendants - 18.8% of the total-are listed as
"dismissed. ' 5 7 Since "dismissed" is a catchall category, covering a
wide variety of situations, a precise interpretation of this category is
impossible. 58 Some dismissals result from plea agreements under
which the prosecutor dismisses a felony indictment and then files an
information on a lesser charge to which the defendant pleads guilty;
this is listed as one dismissal and one guilty plea.5 9 In other cases,
the prosecutor dismisses a case against a convictable defendant in
exchange for cooperation in other investigations, or in exchange for
Id.
51 See Model Grand Jury Act § 105(2) and Commentary.
52 Kaplan, The ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174, 180 (1965).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN

U.S.

DIsTRIcT COURTS

1982, Table 3 [hereinafter Federal

Offenders].
The statistics on which these figures are based reflect all defendants terminated in a
given year in the U.S. District Courts, regardless of whether their prosecutions were
begun by indictment, information, or otherwise. The federal government does not keep
figures as to the dispositions of criminal cases begun solely by grand jury indictment.
Nonetheless, since well over half of all federal criminal cases are initiated by indictment
(see Federal Offenders, supra note 55, Table 1), these figures are probably representative of
the terminations of indicted defendants.
56 Federal Offenders, supra note 55, Table 3.
57 Id.
58 Conversation with C. Madison Brewer, Director of the Office of Management Information and Support of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, whose office is responsible for compiling such statistics.
59 Id.
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the defendant's confession of guilt and agreement to enter a pretrial diversion program. 60 Other dismissals reflect a procedural
step, such as when a prosecutor, upon receiving new evidence or
when faced with a deficiency in an already returned indictment, dismisses one indictment and presents a superseding indictment to the
grand jury against the same defendant or a case is transferred to
another district pursuant to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 6 1 Available statistics do not distinguish these cases
from those in which the prosecutor dismisses an indictment due to
62
insufficient evidence.
Conservatively assuming that prosecutors dismissed only half of
these defendants for strategic or technical reasons unrelated to the
strength of the government's cases, prosecutors have a conviction
rate of over 85%.63 The federal conviction rate is more likely 90%
or greater.64 This surely does not indicate any widespread error or
abuse in the federal prosecutors' decisions as to whom to indict.
Since the A.B.A. reformers did not have statistical support, they
relied on a mixture of speculation and anecdote to suggest that
prosecutor-dominated grand juries return unwarranted indictments. 65 In one argument, they contended that many prosecutors
believe it is proper to try to convict without trial someone whom
they believe has committed a crime, even though the suspect's legal
guilt probably cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
66
because the admissible evidence is only marginally sufficient.
Generally, the reformers assumed that prosecutors think they can
indict doubtfully convictable defendants, and still retain their high
conviction rates by pressuring these defendants to plead guilty to
the indicted offense or some lesser charge. 6 7 Thus, Professor
Arenella argued:
While most prosecutors claim that they would not seek an indictment unless there was a high probability of securing a conviction at
trial, recent studies of state prosecutorial practices suggest otherwise.
Foremost among the reasons for defective screening of legal guilt is
60
61
62
63

Id.
Id.
See Federal Offenders, supra note 55, Table 3.
Since the "dismissed" category incorporates more than just those cases for which

the prosecutor had insufficient evidence, one half of all "dismissed" defendants - 9.4%
of the total group - must be eliminated from the sample base. Assuming an initial
sample base of 1000 defendants, the adjusted base is 906 defendants, of whom 777 are
convicted. The conviction rate is thus 777/906, or 85.8%.
64 This is the authors' estimate and is based on trial practice experience.
65
66

See Arenella, supra note 10.
Id. at 503-05.

67

Id.
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the possibility of conviction through plea-bargaining. Many state
prosecutors find nothing wrong with charging and convicting a defendant whom they believe is factually guilty even though the government lacks sufficient admissible evidence to convict at trial. Not
surprisingly, they view the doctrine of legal guilt as a technicality that
interferes with their own view that justice is done when criminal sanctions are applied to defendants they believe to be factually guilty.
Others accept the doctrine's validity but equate it with the exclusionary rule and the trial's formal proof requirements. In their view, defendants waive its requirements when they plead guilty because the
doctrine applies only to the criminal trial itself.
Thus, a prosecutor may seek an indictment when the evidence of
guilt is marginal and then offer an attractive bargain to induce a guilty
plea. Moreover, the absence of any effective limits on prosecutorial
discretion in filing charges permits the prosecutor to enhance the government's plea-bargaining position by charging the defendant with
more serious crimes than the evidence or the facts of a particular case
warrant. To prompt a plea in weak cases, some prosecutors engage in
bluffing tactics where they puff the strength of the case before offering
an attracti e bargain. These prosecutors regard this practice as legitimate and skillful bargaining even in cases where the prosecutor
know68
ingly lacks sufficient evidence of legal guilt to reach the jury.
Although Professor Arenella asserted the existence of the practice and its widespread use, he tendered no supporting evidence
other than a single study which reflected the views and practices of
unidentified state prosecutors. 69 Even if the study's authors are correct in their assertions about state prosecutors, this does not establish the need for widespread reform of thefederal grand jury system.
There does not appear to be any evidence that federal prosecutors
seek indictments in cases where they know the evidence is insuffi70
cient and then offer an attractive plea bargain to the defendants.
Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to support Professor
Arenella's other charges of prosecutorial abuse. To support his
claim that federal prosecutors may indict unconvictable defendants,
Professor Arenella cited one article by a former Assistant United
States Attorney who, more than 20 years ago, served for four years
68

Id. at 503-05 (footnotes omitted).

69 See H.

MILLER, W. McDONALD & J. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNrrED

STATES (1978), cited in Arenella, supra note 10 at 471 n.26.
70 Department of Justice guidelines forbid the practice

of striking a plea bargain
when the prosecutor lacks sufficient evidence to reach thejury: "[AlIthough it is proper
to consider factors bearing upon the likelihood of conviction in deciding whether to
enter into a plea agreement, it is obviously improper for the prosecutor to attempt to
dispose of a case by means of a plea agreement if he is not satisfied that the legal standards of guilt are met." Principles of Federal Prosecution, Comment to Principle D.2(f),
27 CR. L. REP. at 3284.
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in the Northern District of California. 7 1 Yet the article he cited
stated that "prosecution would almost never be commenced unless
the chances of success seemed better than fair," and "most assistants felt it was not right to use the prosecutional system just to harass an individual, however guilty he might be and hence, unless the
'
case could be won, it was morally wrong to prosecute it." 72
Professor Arenella also alleged that prosecutors may seek to indict unconvictable defendants for political reasons, and cited the
practices of the Nixon administration as evidence. 7 3 Clearly,
prosecutorial excesses such as are attributed to the Nixon administration's Department of Justice cannot be justified. However, our
experience, encompassing many years in active federal criminal
practice, both defending and prosecuting, and our observations of
the federal criminal justice system as it operates throughout the
country, indicates strongly that today the government seldom uses
74
or abuses federal grand juries for political purposes.
We believe that the A.B.A. reform proponents have failed to
establish the existence of problems significant enough to justify the
drastic changes they propose. Unnecessary tinkering with working
machinery usually leads to trouble. The federal grand jury system
"ain't broke" and therefore doesn't need fixing.
Even if it is true that, as Professor Arenella assumed, federal
prosecutors seek indictments in cases in which the evidence is insufficient, or trump up indictments for political reasons, 75 it is highly
questionable whether the proposed solutions will alleviate the problem. Professor Arenella's theory is that the grand jury will reliably
adjudicate the appropriateness of a defendant's going to trial if it is
provided with evidence similar to that which will be placed before a
Kaplan, supra note 52, dited in Arenella, supra note 10, at 505.
72 Kaplan, supra note 52, at 180. The author identified two areas in which he observed federal prosecutions undertaken "even though the chances of conviction appeared somewhat less than was usually demanded," namely, cases in which "the decisive
question was one of search and seizure," where the case would not be prosecutable if a
motion to suppress were granted, and cases involving "more serious crimes," where a
greater than usual chance of losing was believed justifiable. Even for these more serious
crimes, however, prosecution would not be undertaken if the case appeared too weak to
obtain a conviction, or if the accused, if convicted, was unlikely to receive a sufficiently
severe sentence. Id. at 181. Contrary to the impression Professor Arenella gives to his
readers the overall thrust of Mr. Kaplan's experience is that, in almost all cases, prosecutions were not instituted unless the likelihood of conviction appeared great.
73 Arenella, supra note 10, at 505-06.
74 See also Kaplan, supra note 52, at 181. Former Assistant U.S. Attorney Kaplan
states that "it was generally felt that where the public eye would be on the prosecution,
the criticism would be all the more severe if the case were lost. As a result, it was often
stated that, 'if you go after a big one, you must be pretty sure you can get him."' Id.
75 See Arenella, supra note 10, at 503-05.
71
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petit jury at the actual trial. 76 Professor Arenella admits that this is
an untested theory.7 7 Indeed, there is good reason to doubt that it
will be effective.
The fact that the grand jury will hear certain evidence it may
not have heard without these reforms does not guarantee a better
screening process. The "reformed" grand jury will probably hear
more of the government's actual prospective trial witnesses, and
fewer federal agents giving summaries of trial witnesses' testimony.
However, there will still be no cross-examination, without which an
accurate assessment of a witness' credibility cannot be made.
Furthermore, even though a judge may admonish the grand
jury to screen out weak cases, 78 the grand jury will still look only to
the prosecutor for guidance. Prosecutors will still decide which
cases or individuals to investigate, which witnesses to call, and what
evidence to present. They will still be the ones who interpret the
laws for the grand jury. If prosecutors are at all sensitive, they will
establish rapport with the grand jury. Prosecutors will still communicate to the grand jury, however subtly, their belief that the grand
jury should indict the suspect. Thus, even with the reforms, when a
grand jury is straddling the fence on the question of probable cause,
it will almost certainly accede to the prosecutor's judgment, as it
does in the present system.
The only real check on the initiation of prosecution, then, will
be the court's review of the grand jury transcript. Professor
Arenella apparently hoped that the prospect of such a review would
deter the prosecutor from asking the grand jury to return indictments against defendants who have a questionable likelihood of
conviction. This does not appear likely. The Model Act's standards
are not difficult to meet, though they force prosecutors to jump
through several hoops and burden courts with the time consuming
task of applying them. 79 Marginal cases will pass this review, and
thus the Model Act will not deter prosecutors from prosecuting
them. At best, the review process will discourage prosecutors from
pursuing egregiously weak cases, however, the reformers have not
established that prosecutors present such cases for indictment to
federal grand juries today.
While the benefit of these proposals is negligible, the added
Id. at 540 n.387; see also Arenella, supra note 14 at 13.
See Arenella, supra note 10, at 540 n.387.
See Model Grand Jury Act §204 (elements of the charge to the grand jury).
79 For example, the reform proposal's ban on hearsay will force prosecutors to bring
several witnesses before the grand jury, rather than relying on one federal agent's summation of these witnesses' testimony.
76
77
78
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burden they would impose on the system is certain to be great.
Prosecutors will have to spend additional time and taxpayers'
money preparing for more intricate grand jury proceedings. They
will have to bring nearly all witnesses before the grand jury, which
will necessitate not only added preparation time, but also added
transportation expense. The review process will surely necessitate
substantial judicial time and expense as well. As five members of
the Criminal Justice Council who filed a minority report criticizing
the Act stated:
The drafters of the proposed Act have created a process which is
calculated to burden the criminal justice system with an additional
level of review in every case. It can be expected with some confidence
that the motion for review will be the norm; indeed, 8it0 will verge on
ineffective representation not to make such a motion.
The minority report ultimately rejected the concept ofjudicial
review in all cases, as did the A.B.A. House of Delegates at its January 1982 meeting."' We share the minority report's opinion as to
the failure of the Model Act's drafters to make the case for reform:
The drafters suggest that such a revolution [providing for judicial
review of the sufficiency of every indictment] is necessary because the
grand jury will otherwise be unable effectively to serve its screening
function and because prosecutors now rely on their ability to bring
criminal charges and to coerce guilty pleas without providing the defendant [with] a forum in which to test the legitimacy of these charges.
But we suggest that, whatever the value of an academic debate on the
merits of our present criminal justice system, there has been no showsufficient to justify the A.B.A.'s
ing of a flaw in the grand jury process
82
proposing.

. .

such a revolution.

Thus, a defendant should not have the right to have a court review
the sufficiency of an indictment which is valid on its face.
IV.

SAFEGUARDING AGAINST PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE IN THE

FEDERAL GRAND JURY

We have argued that the federal grand jury functions well as an
accusatory body, and should not be subjected to radical change.
Nonetheless, we realize that the grand jury system gives the federal
prosecutor an awesome amount of power. As Justice Jackson said,
while he was Attorney General, "The prosecutor has more control
over life, liberty and reputation than any other person in America.
83
His discretion is tremendous.
80
81
82
83

Arenella supra note 14, at 50.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 51.
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM.

JUDicATURE

SOC'Y 18 (1940).
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After all is said and done, the best safeguard against grand jury
abuse is the appointment and training of intelligent, experienced,
compassionate people to serve as prosecutors. Since even highly
capable and experienced persons can make errors ofjudgment, it is
also important that each prosecutorial office institute a review system regarding the decision to indict. For example, for many years
the federal prosecutor in the Northern District of Illinois has utilized a tiered process to review proposals to indict.8 4 An Assistant
U.S. Attorney ("Assistant") who wishes to submit an indictment to
the grand jury must first submit a "prosecution memorandum" and
a draft copy of the indictment to both the chief and deputy chief of
his division. The memorandum contains the names of the prospective defendants, the specific statutes under which they will be
charged, the specific counts of the contemplated indictment, the
agents and agency which helped to prepare the case, a summary of
the evidence available against each defendant, and an analysis of
possible defenses, evidentiary problems, and other matters which
might affect the successful prosecution of the case. The division
chief and/or deputy meet with the Assistant in conference to discuss
the prosecution memorandum. They also discuss foreseeable
problems with the prosecution of the case. Often, they will ask the
Assistant to do more preparation before proceeding with the approval process. If and when the division chief approves the indictment at the indictment conference, the memorandum and draft
indictment are sent to the First Assistant U.S. Attorney, who reviews
them and either sends them back for further clarification or approves them and forwards them to the U.S. Attorney. The U.S. Attorney performs one final review, signs the indictment, and sends it
back so that the Assistant can submit the case to the grand jury.
Only prospective indictments which have passed all three levels of
review are submitted to the grand jury.8 5
Similar systems of review are in place in many other U.S. Attorneys' offices and within the Department ofJustice.8 6 We believe the
87
Department of Justice should amend the U.S. Attorneys' Manual
84

These procedures have never been formalized in writing. These procedures were

in effect during the period of 1977-81 when author Thomas P. Sullivan was U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.
85 The grand jurors do not know of this review process, nor do they see the copy of
the indictment signed by the U.S. Attorney until after they have voted a true bill.
86 It is interesting to observe that no such review system was in place during Mr.
Kaplan's term as an Assistant in the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District
of California. Kaplan, supra note 52, at 176.
87 The U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANuAL, a Department ofJustice publication contained in a
series of looseleaf notebooks which are updated periodically, reflects the current state of
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to mandate such a review process in every federal prosecutorial office before a prosecutor may present an indictment to the grand
jury. The review will guard against an individual prosecutor's misjudgment or overreaching.
There are other adjustments which profitably may be made to
the grand jury system. We support several of the fine-tunings suggested by the A.B.A. Principles and the Model Grand Jury Act, but
for reasons different from those of the authors of those documents.
We welcome most of the A.B.A.'s principles, but not because they
will empower the grand jury to make independent judgments. We
believe that every grand jury inevitably will approve almost every
indictment presented by the prosecutor, even in marginal cases.
The A.B.A.'s changes will benefitthe system by reminding the prosecutor of his or her duty and by allowing the grand jury to better aid
the prosecutor in his or her exercise ofjudgment. While we believe
these changes to be beneficial, we do not believe them to be vital to
the proper functioning of the system. Accordingly, though we support many of the A.B.A. Principles regarding prosecutorial duties as
guidelines for federal prosecution, we do not believe a violation
should be cause to dismiss the indictment.
We support the A.B.A. Principles concerning the court's and the
prosecutor'scharge to the grandjury. We believe that the court and prosecutor should clearly advise grandjuries of their duties and responsibilities. Additionally, the grand juries should be told the elements
of the alleged crimes.8 8 The better informed the grand jury, the
more it will help the prosecutor in screening cases.
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual already contains provisions reflecting several of the other proposed reforms. Regarding exculpatory evidence, the Manual provides, "when a prosecutor conducting a grand
jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of the subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand
jury before seeking an indictment against such a person."8 9 Regarding unconstitutionallyobtained evidence, the Manual provides, "[a] prosecutor should not present to the grand jury for use against a person
whose constitutional rights clearly have been violated evidence
which the prosecutor personally knows was obtained as a direct rethe law, and official Department ofJustice policy. Citations are to the Manual current as
of May 1, 1984.
88 See A.B.A. Principles 22 and 27. In advocating these principles, we do not mean to
suggest that defense attorneys may use an allegedly faulty grand jury instruction as a
basis for quashing an indictment.
89 U.S. ATroRNEYS' MANUAL
9-11.334.
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sult of the constitutional violation." 9 0 Apart from differing enforcement mechanisms, the Department of Justice and the A.B.A. are in
accord regarding the prosecutor's duty with respect to exculpatory
evidence and constitutionally inadmissible evidence. 9 1
Hearsay presents a more difficult problem. At its 1984 mid-year
meeting, the American Bar Association approved a new Grand Jury
Reform Principle about hearsay: "Absent some compelling necessity, the prosecutor should not present the grand jury with a hearsay
version of critical eyewitness testimony as a substitute for such testimony when it is available." 9 2 The Model Act's version of the hear93
say provision, which the A.B.A. rejected, is much more stringent.
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual, on the other hand, eschews even the
broad, rather vague standards approved by the A.B.A. The Manual
sets no hard and fast rule, except that prosecutors should present
94
hearsay evidence for what it is, rather than as first-hand testimony.
Other than this provision, it leaves the whole question of hearsay
evidence to the discretion of the individual prosecutor:
Each United States Attorney should be accountable to himself in this
regard and to the grand jurors ....

The question should not be so

much whether to use hearsay evidence, but whether, at the end, the
presentation was in keeping with the professional obligations of attorneys for the government, and afforded the grand jurors a substantial
basis for voting upon an indictment.9 5
We believe that the current Department of Justice position on
hearsay is basically correct. In the abstract, the general principle,
"whenever possible, present first person testimony," is appealing,
but in practice, the question of whether to use first person or hearsay testimony is often a question of available time and resources time and money to transport the witness, and time to prepare the
witness to testify. Since, in reality, the prosecutor rather than the
grand jury performs the effective screening function, we are not
troubled by leaving this decision up to the prosecutor's discretion.
We propose, however, adding two sentences to the U.S. Attorneys'
90 U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL
9-11.331.
91 Compare U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL
9-11.334 with A.B.A. Principle 3; compare U.S.

ATrORNEYS' MANUAL 9-11.331 with A.B.A. Principle 6.
92 See 1984 Mid-Year Meeting Report, supra note 39, at 108B.
93 See Model Grand Jury Act § 100.

2. The prosecutor shall present to the grand jury evidence admissible at trial on
each of the material elements of the offense, absent some compelling necessity for
use of evidence which is not admissible at trial or unless the evidence falls within
sections (3) [reports of experts] or (4) [certain basic facts] below. Such necessity
must be stated on the record at the time of its admission.

Id.
94 U.S. AfrORNEYS' MANUAL

95 Id.

9-11.332.

1984]

IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT

1067

Manual's provision on hearsay9 6 to the effect that, (1) the key government witnesses, such as accomplices, eyewitnesses, and victims,
should, if possible, testify before the grand jury; and (2) if U.S. Attorneys or Assistants entertain serious doubts about a witness' credibility, they should, if possible, present this witness to the grand jury
97
for scrutiny.
Several A.B.A. Principles concern the rights of witnesses before the
grandjury. Both the U.S. Attorneys' Manual and the A.B.A. Principles agree that targets of grand jury investigations should have the
opportunity to testify before the grand jury,98 that the government
should tell targets that they are possible indictees, 99 and that all witnesses should know of their privilege against self-incrimination. 10 0
The right of witnesses to be accompaniedby attorneys into the grandjury
room has caused a great deal of controversy. The Department ofJustice disapproves of the practice, while the A.B.A. favors it. 101 When
attorneys were first allowed into grand jury rooms in state court systems, opponents feared that attorneys would disrupt grand jury proceedings. In practice, counsel have been able to behave themselves
while in the grand jury room. 10 2 Therefore, there is no overriding
reason for barring counsel from the grand jury room1 0 3 so long as
counsel clearly understand that their role is limited to advising the
client quietly, and that counsel are not permitted to address the
grand jurors or otherwise take an active part in the proceedings
before the grand jury.
Whether or not witnesses are allowed to bring counsel into the
96 Id.

97 We believe the prosecutor should not withhold a witness from the grand jury

simply because he is reluctant to make a record which might later be used to impeach
that witness.
98
99
100
101

Compare A.B.A. Principle 5 with U.S. ATrOREYs' MANUAL T 9-11.252.
Compare A.B.A. Principle 2 with U.S. ArToRNEYs' MANuAL 9-11.250.
Id.
ContrastA.B.A. Principle 1 with U.S. ATrOmRNEYs' MANUAL 9-11.356.

102 See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 1571, 1574. "[N]o public prosecutor of any of
the more populous districts of those states which to any extent authorize the presence of
counsel, and of whom inquiry was made, has reported any actual disruption of the grand
jury's proceedings by reason of the presence of counsel for the witness." Id.
103 One special problem may arise in organized crime, corporate, or political corruption investigations, when the lawyer representing a witness also represents the witness'
employer and/or the target of the investigation. Prosecutors fear that the attorney's
presence in the grand jury room may inhibit an otherwise willing witness from cooperating with the grand jury. We question whether the inhibition will be much greater than it

is under the current system: lawyers can usually judge whether a witness is cooperating
by the length of time the witness is before the grandjury. Further, if the witness desires
to cooperate with the government without his lawyer's knowledge, he can meet secretly
with a government agent and give a statement to be read to the grand jury, thus avoiding the necessity of a personal appearance before the grand jury.
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grand jury room, we believe that Congress should amend Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to provide that witnesses are entitled to a transcript of their own testimony before the grand jury,
provided that they make appropriate arrangements to reimburse the
government for its costs.' 0 4 This is a logical extension of Rule
6(e)(1)'s requirement that grand jury proceedings be recorded, and
Rule 6(e)(2)'s exemption of witnesses from the grand jury rule of
secrecy. Transcripts would be especially helpful to witnesses who
appear at grand jury hearings without attorneys and later seek legal
representation on an issue related to their testimony. At present,
many courts require witnesses to show a compelling necessity
before allowing them access to their own testimony. 10 5
We also believe that Congress should amend the so-called
'Jencks Act,"' 1 6 to provide defendants with earlier access to grand
jury testimony and other prior statements of prospective witnesses,
unless there is a risk of physical harm or intimidation to a witness, or
other good cause. The government should have the burden of
proof to show cause for withholding the material. Earlier access will
give the defense more time to prepare its case properly. It may also
aid defendants in deciding whether or not to seek or accept a plea
bargain. As Professor Arenella pointed out, defendants often are
forced to make their plea-bargaining decisions in the dark, without a
good idea of the strength of the prosecution's case.' 07 If a defendant knew what kind of case the government had against him, he
could make a more intelligent plea bargaining decision.
We also propose one more reform that has not been addressed
by the A.B.A. We suggest that the size of the grandjury be reduced from
twenty-three people to a smaller number, perhaps seven, nine, or
eleven. This reduction in size will eliminate many logistical
problems currently posed by twenty-three person grand juries, at no
cost to the effectiveness of the system. The chief benefit of the
grand jury - having citizens from the outside observe and participate in the investigation and charging process - can be accomplished just as well with fewer than twenty-three persons. Many
104 See Wing & Cushman, GrandJuy Taping: Should a Witness Be Allowed to Record Testimony?, NAT. LJ., March 5, 1984, at 15.
105 See, e.g., United States v. Clavey, 578 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (en
banc), vacating, 565 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978) (affirming,
without en banc opinion because of equally divided en banc court, district court decision
withholding from defendant a transcript of his own grand jury testimony absent a showing of compelling need); Bast v. United States, 542 F.2d 893, 896 (4th Cir. 1976), and
cases cited therein. But see Judge Wyzanski's dissent in Bast, 542 F.2d at 897-99.
106 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
107 Arenella, supra note 10, at 511.
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states now successfully utilize grand juries with fewer than twentythree people. 10 8 Typically, states using smaller grand juries have
created a "super majority" requirement for the approval of indictments. 10 9 We believe that these requirements effectively compensate for whatever lack of diversity might result from the reduction in
the number of grand jurors. On an eleven-person grand jury, for
example, we propose that no indictment be returned unless approved by a vote of at least seven members.
V.

CONCLUSION

Because the grand jury already functions well as an accusatory
body, it should remain the primary charging vehicle in the federal
system, and should not be subjected to the widespread reforms proposed by the American Bar Association and the Model Grand Jury
Act. Specifically, defendants should not routinely have the right to
judicial review of the sufficiency of evidence before the grand jury.
Since the grand jury has such vast power, and since the prosecutor
has so much influence over the grand jury, some form of oversight
and guidance of federal prosecutors is necessary. We believe that a
tiered system of review of the decision to seek an indictment will
provide the needed oversight, and will help to eliminate whatever
abuse currently exists. The other reforms which we have proposed
or approved will further fine-tune the system to make it more efficient and equitable overall.

108 Twenty-one states currently allow 12 or fewer people to constitute a grand jury;
four of these states allow 7 or fewer people to serve as a grand jury. See J. VAN DYKE,
supra note 6, at 264-70.
109 For example, Iowa requires 5 of 7 grand jurors in order to indict and Ohio requires 7 of 9 grand jurors to indict. Id.

